Classification models are often used to make decisions that affect humans: whether to approve a loan application, extend a job offer, or provide insurance. In such applications, individuals should have the ability to change the decision of the model. When a person is denied a loan by a credit scoring model, for example, they should be able to change the input variables of the model in a way that will guarantee approval. Otherwise, this person will be denied the loan so long as the model is deployed, and -more importantlywill lack agency over a decision that affects their livelihood.
INTRODUCTION
In the context of machine learning, we define recourse as the ability of a person to obtain a desired outcome from a fixed prediction model. Consider, for example, a classification model used for loan approval. If this model provides recourse to someone who is denied a loan, then this person has the ability to change the input variables of the model in a way that guarantees approval. Otherwise, this person will be denied the loan so long as the model is deployed, and will lack agency in the decision-making process of the model.
Recourse is not formally studied in machine learning. In this work, we argue that it should be. A model should provide an individual with recourse when it is used to allocate a good that should be universally accessible, such as credit [29] , employment [2] and public services [8, 28] . However, recourse should also be considered more broadly given that a lack of human agency is perceived as a source of injustice in algorithmic decision-making [5, 10, 21, 33] .
The potential lack of recourse in algorithmic decision-making is often used to motivate calls for transparency and explainability [see e.g., 9, 12, 38] . However, transparency and explainability do not guarantee recourse. As we will show, even a simple transparent model such as a linear classifier can fail to provide recourse due to common modeling practices that are difficult to regulate, including:
• Choice of Features: A classifier could use features that are immutable (e.g., female), conditionally immutable (e.g., has_phd, which can only change from FALSE → TRUE), or should not be considered actionable (e.g., married).
• Choice of Operating Point: A probabilistic classifier that provides recourse at a given threshold (e.g., predictŷ = 1 if predicted risk of default ≥ 50%) may deny recourse at a more conservative threshold (e.g., predictŷ = 1 if predicted risk of default ≥ 80%).
• Out-of-Sample Deployment: A feature that could be altered to achieve a desired outcome may be missing, immutable, or distributed adversely in the population where the model is deployed. The effects of these practices on recourse vary significantly based on how a model is developed and the population on which it is deployed (i.e., the target population). In turn, an audit provides a practical approach to evaluate recourse because it does not affect model development and could be specialized to consider individuals within the target population. Even when a model is guaranteed to provide recourse in a target population, however, it could require drastic changes that effectively preclude certain individuals from achieving a desired outcome. Ideally, an audit should therefore evaluate both the feasibility and difficulty of recourse for individuals on which a model is deployed.
In this paper, we present a practical toolkit to audit recourse for linear classification models (e.g. logistic regression models, linear support vector machines, and rule-based models that can be expressed as linear models such as rule sets and decision lists). Our tools can inform stakeholders (e.g. individuals, practitioners, regulators) with the answers to questions such as:
• Does a model provide recourse to all individuals who are subject to its predictions?
• How does the difficulty of recourse vary across individuals within a target population?
• Are there systematic disparities in recourse across subgroups of individuals in the target population?
• What changes can a person make to attain a desired prediction from the model?
• How much easier would these changes be if a person could change immutable attributes, such as race or gender?
Our tools are based on an optimization problem that, given a classifier and a person in the target population, will identify changes that the person can make to flip their predicted outcome. Our problem is formulated to return changes that are actionable, meaning that they will not affect immutable features, nor alter mutable features in an infeasible way (e.g., n_credit_cards from 5 → 0.5 or 5 → −1, or has_phd from TRUE → FALSE). Since finding actionable changes for discrete features requires searching over a discrete space, the optimization problem is non-convex and therefore computationally challenging. To let an auditor definitively assert that a model does not provide an individual with recourse, we solve this problem directly: we express it as an integer program (IP) and solve it with an IP solver (e.g., CPLEX, Gurobi, or CBC).
We solve this optimization in order to design two tools to evaluate recourse within a population of interest:
1. A procedure to measure the feasibility and cost of recourse of a classifier for individuals in a target population (i.e., for model development, model procurement, or algorithmic impact assessments [23] ). When our optimization problem is infeasible, this means that there is no actionable change for a person to attain the desired outcome (i.e., the classifier does not provide recourse for this person). Accordingly, an auditor can assert that a model provides recourse to individuals in a target population by solving our problem for samples from the target population. By comparing the cost of recourse among individuals in the sample, we can assess the difficulty of changes required to achieve a desired outcome.
2. A method to generate a list of actionable changes that an individual can make to flip the prediction of the classifier. We refer to this list as a flipset and present an example in Figure 1 . In the United States, for example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act [36] requires that individuals who are denied credit must be sent an adverse action notice to explain the principal reason for the denial. It is well-known that an adverse action notice can fail to provide actionable information [see 26, 32, for a discussion]. By including a flipset in an adverse action notice, an individual would know exact changes that they can make to guarantee approval in the future. e., row) shows actionable changes to a subset of features used by the model that will "flip" its prediction fromŷ = −1 toŷ = +1. The changes guarantee that the person will be approved for credit so long as other features do not change. We describe how to build flipsets in Section 3.4, and discuss their limitations in Section 5.2.
Related Work. Our work can be viewed as an application of inverse classification [1] , which aims to determine how the inputs to a prediction model can be manipulated to obtain a desired outcome [see e.g., 7, 40, for other applications].
Our work is broadly related to tools that explain predictions of machine learning models at an individual level [see e.g., 24, 30] . Although such tools can provide valuable explanations of how a model produces a specific prediction, these explanations do not necessarily reveal actionable changes that will produce a desired outcome. More importantly, these tools do not provide an auditor with a way to certify that a model does not provide an individual with recourse nor a way to measure the difficulty of recourse.
Our ideas build on seminal work on counterfactual explanations by Wachter et al. [38] 1 . In particular, the solution to our optimization problem is a counterfactual explanation that is actionable and globally optimal with respect to a user-specified cost function. Our optimization problem is fundamentally different from an optimization problem considered in Wachter et al. [38] . While the latter problem can extract counterfactual explanations from black-box models, it does not provide the feasibility or optimality guarantees to audit recourse because: (i) it does not restrict changes to be actionable; (ii) it only considers changes that are reflected in a training dataset (i.e., a feasible action is defined as a ∈ {x − x ′ } where x, x ′ are points in a training dataset) 2 . These issues are difficult to address without formulating and solving a non-convex optimization problem as we do in this paper.
Other concepts related to recourse in machine learning include: anchors, which are subsets of features that fix the predicted outcome [25] ; adversarial perturbations, which studies the robustness of predictions with respect to small changes in input [14] ; and strategic classification, which considers the converse problem of training classifiers that is robust to manipulation [11, 16] . We provide a broader discussion on the relationship between recourse and other objectives in the machine learning in Section 5.3.
Software and Workshop Paper. We provide a software implementation of our tools and scripts to reproduce our experimental results at http://github.com/ustunb/actionable-recourse. This work extends a short workshop paper that was presented at FAT/ML 2018 [31] .
PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first define an optimization problem that we solve to evaluate recourse, and then present formal guarantees related to the feasibility and cost of recourse of a linear classifier. We provide proofs for all results in Appendix A.
Optimization Framework
We consider a standard classification task where each individual is characterized by a vector of features x = [1,
and a binary label y ∈ {−1, +1}. We wish to audit a linear classifier f (x) = sign(⟨w, x⟩) where
is a vector of coefficients and w 0 is the intercept. We denote the desired outcome asŷ = 1 and assume that
Given an individual whose predicted outcome is f (x) = −1, we aim to determine if there exists an action a such that f (x + a) = 1. To this end, we solve an optimization problem of the form, min cost(a; x)
where: 1 Given a model and the features, a counterfactual explanation is the smallest set of changes to the features that produces a desired prediction. 2 To illustrate some practical consequences of (i) and (ii): the approach in [38] could output an explanation that states that a person can flip their prediction by changing an immutable feature, due to (i). If so, an auditor could not conclude that the model did not provide recourse, as there could exist a way to flip the prediction that was not reflected in the training data, due to (ii).
• A(x) is a set of feasible actions a = [0, a 1 . . . a d ] from x. We constrain each element of a to produce a feasible value of a j ∈ A j (x j ) ⊆ {a j ∈ R | a j + x j ∈ X j }. We let A j (x) = {0} if feature j is immutable, and say that a feature is conditionally immutable if there exists x ∈ X such that A j (x) = {0}.
• cost( · ; x) : A(x) → R + is a user-specified cost function that encodes preferences between feasible actions from x, or measures other quantities of interest in an audit (see e.g., Sections 3.3 and 3.4). Users can choose any cost function that satisfies two properties: (i) cost(0; x) = 0 (no action ⇔ no cost); (ii) cost(a; x) ≤ cost(a + ϵ1 j ; x) (larger actions ⇔ higher cost). Solving the optimization problem in (1) for an individual with features x has different implications with respect to recourse:
• If (1) is infeasible, then no action can achieve a desired outcome from x. Thus, we have certified that the model does not provide actionable recourse for an individual with features x.
• If (1) is feasible, then its optimal solution is the minimal-cost action to flip the prediction of x. In this case, we can use the solution to create an item in a flipset (see Section 3.4).
Notation, Assumptions, and Terminology. Given a linear classifier f (x) = sign(⟨w, x⟩), we express its coefficient vector as w = [w A , w N ], where w A and w N contain the coefficients for features that are actionable and immutable, respectively. We denote the index sets for all features as J = {1, . . . , d}, for actionable features as J A (x) = {j ∈ J | |A j (x)| > 1} and immutable features as J N (x) = {j ∈ J | A j (x) = 0}. We drop the dependence of index sets on x when it is clear from the context.
We assume that the classifier is deployed on a target population where features belong to a bounded space (i.e., for all x ∈ X, ∥x ∥ ≤ B for a sufficiently large B). We define the following subspaces based on the predicted label f (x) and the true label y:
Feasibility Guarantees
We start with a simple sufficient condition for a linear classifier to provide recourse to all individuals in any target population.
Remark 1.
A linear classifier provides recourse to all individuals with features x ∈ H − if it only uses actionable features, and does not trivially predict a single class.
Remark 1 is a simple condition that can be used to guide regulations in applications where a classifier must provide recourse, or to design screening questions for algorithmic impact assessments (e.g., "can a person change all of the input variables to the classifier?"). We observe that converse of Remark 1 is also true: that is, a classifier does not provide recourse if all features are immutable or it trivially predicts a single class. In what follows, we therefore restrict our attention to linear classifiers with non-zero coefficients w 0 that do not trivially predict a single class for the target population.
The following remarks show that the feasibility of recourse hinges on the boundedness of the feature space. The boundedness of features merits further discussion given that most real-world classifiers contain a mix of actionable and immutable features. Given such classifiers, the ability of an auditor to state that the model does not provide recourse depends on the bounds that are imposed on real-valued features 3 . Since infeasibility has important ramifications in practice, real-valued features should be bounded judiciously (i.e., so that an auditor will not report infeasibility due to overly restrictive bounds) 4 . This approach has the drawback in that a classifier may provide recourse by making large changes feasible. If this is the case, however, then these changes should be reflected in large values of the cost (see e.g., Section 3.2)
Recourse is not guaranteed when a classifier uses features that are immutable or conditionally immutable (e.g., age or has_phd). As shown in Example 2.1, a classifier that uses an immutable feature could achieve perfect predictive accuracy without providing a universal recourse guarantee. In practice, such features may be desirable to include in a model as they can improve its predictive performance or its robustness to strategic manipulation.
Cost Guarantees
In Theorem 2.3, we provide a bound on the expected cost of recourse in a target population. Definition 2.2. The expected cost of recourse of a classifier f : X → {−1, +1}, over the target population is defined as:
where a * is an optimal solution to the optimization problem in (1).
Our guarantee is expressed in terms of a general cost function with the form cost(a; x) = c(x) · ∥a∥ , where c : X → (0, +∞) is a positive scaling function for actions starting from x ∈ X, and X is a closed convex set. 3 Bounds are easier to set for binary and ordinal features as they are bounded by definition. Bounds on real-valued features exist since the target population is finite. However, they may be more difficult to set without information on the target population. 4 In our experiments in Section 4, we set bounds on real-valued features using the maximum observed value in the sample from the target population. 
where:
is the false omission rate of f in the target population;
is the expected cost of recourse for individuals such that x ∈ H − ∩ D + (false negative predictions);
is the expected cost of recourse for individuals such that x ∈ H − ∩ D − (true negative predictions);
A is the maximum cost of recourse in the target population;
Theorem 2.3 implies that we can reduce the expected cost of recourse by reducing c max (the maximum cost for recourse) or R A (f ) (the internal risk of the classifier).
If we define the cost of recourse as cost(a * ; x) = 0 when an individual receives a favorable predictionf (x) = +1, then the net expected cost of recourse over the entire target population is
Thus, Theorem (2.3) implies that:
Accordingly, we can see that changing the decision point of the classifier so that more individuals in the target population will attain a desirable prediction (i.e., reducing Pr (f (x) ≤ 0)) will reduce the bound on the net expected cost of recourse under cost(f ).
Theorem 2.3 suggests an interesting implication for settings where c D
we see that one can (maliciously) reduce the bound on the expected cost of recourse by increasing the false omission rate π (i.e., by rejecting more individuals with y = +1 who have lower expected costs).
INTEGER PROGRAMMING TOOLKIT
In this section, we first describe how we can solve the optimization problem in (1) using an integer programming approach, and then describe how this procedure can be used to audit recourse and to build flipsets.
IP Formulation
We consider a discretized version of the optimization problem in (1), which can be expressed as an integer program (IP) and solved with an IP solver [see 20, for a list]. This approach has several benefits: (i) it can directly constrain actions for binary, ordinal, and categorical features; (ii) it can optimize non-linear and non-convex cost functions; (iii) it allows users to customize the set of feasible actions; and (iv) it can quickly recover a globally optimal solution or certify that actionable recourse does not exist.
We express the optimization problem in (1) as an IP of the form:
Here, constraint (2a) determines the cost of a feasible action from precomputed cost parameters c jk = cost(x j + a jk ; x j ). Constraint (2b) requires any feasible action to flip the prediction of a linear classifier with coefficients w. Constraints (2c) and (2d) restrict a j to a grid of m j + 1 feasible values a j ∈ {0, a j1 . . . a jm j } via the indicator variables
Note that the variables and constraints only depend on actions for actionable features j ∈ J A since a j = 0 when a feature is immutable.
Customization. Users can easily customize the set of feasible actions by adding logical constraints to (2) . Many constraints can be expressed using the u j indicators (i.e., without the need to introduce new variables). To limit actions to change ≤ r features, we can add the constraint
To ensure actions change only one feature in a subset of features S ⊆ J , we can add the constraint d j ∈S (1 −u j ) ≤ 1. Such constraints are required, for example, when a linear classifier contains a subset of dummy variables to encode a categorical attribute (i.e., a one-hot encoding).
Discretization. In order to ensure that discretization does not affect the feasibility or cost of recourse, we must discretize the actions for real-valued features over a suitable grid.
In Appendix B, we show that discretization does not affect the feasibility of recourse when we restrict the actions for real-valued features to a grid that contains the same upper and lower bounds. We also show how the discretization error in the cost of recourse can be controlled by refining the discrete grid.
One can avoid discretization entirely by formulating an IP where we use continuous variables to represent actions for real-valued features (see Appendix B.3 for a formulation). In light of our guarantees in Appendix B, we do not consider this approach because it unnecessarily restricts users to use linear cost functions.
Speed Ups. Although modern IP solvers can quickly solve instances of (2) (≤ 0.1 seconds with CPLEX 12.8), we can further reduce solution time (e.g., for auditing procedures where we solve (2) multiple times) by: (i) dropping the v jk indicators for actions a jk that do not agree in sign with w j ; and (ii) declaring {v j1 . . . v jm j } as a special ordered set of type I, which allows the solver to use a more efficient branch-and-bound algorithm [34] .
Cost Functions
Cost functions should be used to encode preferences between feasible actions or to measure quantities of interest in the target population. However, they should not be used to penalize infeasible actions as infeasibility can be directly modeled by adding hard constraints to the IP formulation. The IP in (2) can optimize a large class of cost functions because it precomputes these values and encodes them in the c jk parameters in constraint (2a). Although IP (2) requires costs to be specified by the values of actions in each dimension, cost functions do not need to be strictly separable since the IP can handle some kinds of non-separability by introducing additional constraints (see e.g., the cost function for auditing in (3)).
We present two "off-the-shelf" cost functions that can be used for auditing and building flipsets in (3) and (4). These functions can be adapted by practitioners who wish to design applicationspecific cost functions. Our functions measure costs in terms of the percentiles of x j and x j + a j : Q j (x j + a j ) and Q j (x j ) where Q j (·) is the CDF of x j in the target population. Unlike standard distance metrics, cost functions based on percentiles do not depend on the scale of features, and account for the distribution of features in the target population. Our functions assign the same cost for a unit percentile change for each feature, which implicitly assumes that percentile changes along different features are equally difficult. This assumption can be relaxed by having a domain expert specify the relative difficulty of changing features relative to a baseline feature.
Auditing Recourse
We can use IP (2) to audit the recourse of a linear classifier on a target population given: (i) the coefficient vector w of the linear classifier; and (ii) a sample of feature vectors from the target population {x i } n i=1 . The auditing procedure solves an instance of IP for each point such that f (x i ) = −1. It produces as output: (i) an estimate of the feasibility of recourse (i.e., the % of points for which the IP is feasible); (ii) estimates of the cost of recourse (i.e., values of cost(a i * ; x i ) where a i * is the minimal-cost action). We discuss how these estimates can be visualized and used to inform stakeholders in Section 4, and discuss extensions in Section 5.1.
As our cost function, we propose the maximum percentile shift:
The benefit of this function is that it produces a meaningful optimal cost. If the optimal cost is 0.25, for example, then any feasible action must change a feature by at least 25 percentiles. That is, no action can flip the prediction without changing a feature by less than 25 percentiles. Using (3) requires replacing constraint (2a) with |J A | constraints of the form cost ≥
c jk v jk for j ∈ J A . Minimizing the cost function in (3) is also useful when we wish to evaluate how the feasibility of recourse changes based on a user-defined limits on the magnitude of actionable changes. Say we wanted to measure how many individuals have recourse when actions for each feature are restricted to changes of at most 50 percentiles vs. at most 90 percentiles. Instead of running two separate audits with action sets that restrict the changes for actionable features to at most a 50 or 90 percentile shift, we can run a single audit that minimizes the maximum cost of an loosely bounded action set, and compare the number of individuals where the optimal cost exceeds 0.5 and 0.9.
Building Flipsets
We build a flipset such as the one shown in Figure 1 by using an enumeration procedure that repeatedly solves the IP in (2) . In order to reliably provide an individual with recourse, flipsets should ideally include multiple actions that will flip the predicted outcome. This is because each action can be infeasible in a way that is only known by the individual [see e.g., 26, for an example].
In Algorithm 1, we present a procedure to enumerate T ≥ 1 minimal-cost actions with distinct combinations of features. Each iteration solves the IP to obtain the optimal action a * , then adds a constraint to the IP to eliminate actions that use the same subset of features as a * . The procedure repeats these steps until it has recovered T actions, or it has certified that the IP is infeasible (which means that it has enumerated a minimal-cost action for all subsets of features that will flip the prediction for x).
Each action a * ∈ A produced by Algorithm 1 can be used to create an item in a flipset by listing the current feature values x j alongside the desired feature values x j + a * j for the set of altered j ∈ S = {j : a * j 0}. Since each a * ∈ A is a global optimum, all other feasible actions that alter the same subset of features as a * will have a higher cost.
Algorithm 1 Enumerate T Minimal Cost Actions for Flipset
Input IP instance of (2) add constraint to IP to remove actions that alter features j ∈ S :
Algorithm 1 can be adapted to produce different kinds of flipsets by changing the constraint in Step 5 to enumerate different kinds of successive optima. For example, one can create a flipset containing mutually exclusive actions by adding the constraint u j = 0 for j ∈ S to remove all features used by a * at each iteration. As our cost function, we propose the total log-percentile shift:
This function aims to produce flipsets where items reflect "easy" changes with respect to the target population. In particular, it ensures that cost of a j increases exponentially as Q j (x j ) → 1. This aims to capture the notion that changes become harder when starting off from a higher percentile value (e.g., changing income from percentiles 90 → 95 is harder than 50 → 55).
DEMONSTRATIONS
In this section, we illustrate how our tools can be used to audit recourse on linear classifiers for credit scoring. We have two goals: (i) to show how an audit can provide useful information for different stakeholders (e.g., individuals, practitioners, and policy-makers);
(ii) to show how the feasibility and difficulty of recourse can be affected by common modeling practices. We provide a software implementation of our tools, and code to reproduce our analyses at http://github.com/ustunb/actionablerecourse. We trained all classifiers as implemented in scikit-learn, and used a standard 10-fold cross-validation (10-CV) setup to tune free parameters and to estimate their predictive performance. We solved all IPs for auditing and flipset generation with the CPLEX 12.8 IP solver [17] on a laptop with 2.6 GHz CPU with 16 GB RAM.
Model Selection
We start with a simple experiment to show how our tools can be used to inform different stakeholders in credit scoring applications.
Setup. We consider a processed version of credit dataset from the UCI Repository [41] . Here, y i = −1 if person i will default on a future credit card payment. The dataset contains n = 30 000 individuals and d = 16 features related to spending and payment patterns, education, credit history, age, and marital status. We assume spending and payment patterns and education are actionable, and consider all other variables to be immutable.
We train ℓ 1 penalized logistic regression (LR) models for ℓ 1 penalty values in the set {1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 500, 1000}. We audit the recourse of each model on the training data by solving (2) for each individual i such thatŷ i = −1. Our IP includes the following constraints to ensure changes are actionable: (i) changes for discrete features must be discrete (e.g. MonthsWithLowSpendingInPast6Months ∈ {0, 1 . . . 6}); (ii) EducationLevel can only increase; (iii) no changes to immutable features.
Results. We summarize the results of our audit in Figure 2 , and present a flipset for a person who is denied credit in Figure 3 .
As shown in Figure 2 , tuning the ℓ 1 penalty has a minor effect on test error, but significantly affects the cost and feasibility of recourse. Specifically, classifiers with small ℓ 1 penalties provide all individuals with recourse. As the ℓ 1 penalty increases, however, the % of individuals with recourse decreases as the coefficients for actionable features are more heavily penalized in comparison to the coefficients for immutable features.
We observe that it is possible to train classifiers that provide actionable recourse for a subset of individuals in the target population. In such cases, the cost of recourse provides an interpretable measure of the relative difficulty of attaining difficulty an desired outcome. Here, we see that increasing the ℓ 1 -penalty almost doubles the median cost of recourse from 0.20 to 0.39 for individuals who retain recourse. This implies that over half of the individuals are unable to flip their prediction without changing one of the inputs to the model by 20 to 39 percentiles Since our audit uses the cost function in (3), a cost of q implies an individual must change a feature by at least q percentiles to attain a desired outcome.
Discussion. Our aim is not to suggest a relationship between recourse and ℓ 1 -regularization, but to show how common practices such as parameter tuning can impact the cost and feasibility of recourse. Here, a practitioner who is primarily interested in performance could deploy a classifier that precludes individuals from achieving a desired outcome (e.g., the one that minimizes mean 10-CV test error), even as there exists a classifier that attains similar performance but provides all individuals with recourse (e.g., a classifier with a slightly lower ℓ 1 penalty). Our tools provide the necessary information for a practitioner to choose between such classifiers and incorporate the feasibility and cost of actionable recourse in their model development pipeline.
Our tools can also identify mechanisms that affect recourse in the target population by comparing recourse-related metrics different action sets A(x). For example, one can evaluate how the mutability of feature j affects recourse by running an audit with an action set where feature j is immutable (A j (x) = 0 for all x ∈ X) vs. an action set where feature j is actionable (A j (x) = X j for all x ∈ X). In this demonstration, such an analysis reveals that the immutable features resulting in infeasibility pertain to credit history (i.e., a binary feature set to 1 if a person has ever defaulted on a loan). Given this information, a practitioner could replace this feature with a mutable variant (i.e., a binary feature set to 1 if a person has recently defaulted on a loan), and thereby deploy a model that provides all individuals with recourse. Such a change may be legally required due to application-specific regulations or broader policies on "forgetfulness" [see e.g., 6, 13, for a discussion]. Our tools can support these efforts by providing measurable evidence in the form of feasibility and cost estimates. 
Out-of-Sample Deployment
We now discuss an experiment that shows how recourse is affected by out-of-sample deployment. We consider a setting where a classifiers is deployed on individuals that are underrepresented in the training population. Our setup is inspired by a real-world feedback loop with credit scoring in the United States, namely: credit scoring models are built using training datasets that underrepresent young adults, since young adults lack the credit history to apply for loans and produce labeled data, thus making it harder for young adults to be approved [see e.g., 39, for a discussion].
Setup. We consider a processed version of the givemecredit dataset [18] from Kaggle. Here, y i = −1 if person i will experience financial distress over the next two years. The dataset contains n = 150 000 individuals and d = 10 features related to their age, number of dependents, and recent financial history. We assume that all features are actionable except for Age and NumberOfDependents. Our audit compares the cost of recourse for individuals in the target population for two ℓ 2 -penalized logistic regression models: 1. Baseline Classifier. This is a baseline model that we use for the sake of comparison. It is trained using all n = 150 000 individuals in the processed dataset, which represents our target population.
2. Biased Classifier. This is the model that we wish to audit. We train this model on a sample of n = 100, 000 individuals from the processed dataset, where individuals with Age < 35 are undersampled by 90% from a baseline dataset. We present both models in Appendix C.2. We set the threshold for approval for each model to approve 50% of individuals in the target population (i.e.,ŷ i = −1 if predicted probability of repaying the loan is < 94.5%). We compute the cost of recourse using percentile distributions of features in the target population.
Results. We summarize the results of our audit in Figure 4 . As shown, the cost of recourse can change significantly when a model is deployed on a population that is different from the population that is trained on. Here, the median cost of recourse for young adults in the target population is 0.79, which means that they can only flip their predictions by a 79 percentile shift in a given feature. In comparison, the median cost of recourse for young adults in the baseline model is 0.11, which is significantly lower. We observe that the differences in the cost of recourse are far less pronounced for other age brackets, as the median cost for individuals that are represented in both populations does not appear to change (0.007)
To illustrate the effects of out-of-sample deployment from an individual perspective, we choose a young adult from the target population who is denied credit by classifiers and show the minimal cost-action that will attain the desired outcome from each classifier in Figure 5 . We observe that the biased classifier requires the same individual to make far more stringent changes for the same individual to obtain a desired outcome. Cost of Recourse Figure 4 : Distribution of the cost of recourse in the target population by age bracket, classifier, and true outcome y. We show the cost of recourse for individuals that receive an undesirable predicted outcome from the biased classifier (left) and the baseline classifier (right). For each classifier, we plot the cost distribution for false negatives (top) and true negatives (bottom). Here, the biased classifier is trained using a dataset that undersamples young adults (Age < 35) while the baseline classifier is trained using a representative dataset from the target population. The cost of recourse for young adults is significantly higher for the biased classifier, regardless of their true outcome.
Discussion. Our aim is not to suggest that out-of-sample deployment increases the cost of recourse, but that it can significantly affect the cost of recourse. Without theoretical guarantees on how recourse can change due to distributional differences in the training data and target population, such effects can only be measured by an audit using a sample of features from the target population. In practice, this procedure could be used for model procurement, where classifiers are trained using datasets that are significantly different from the target population on which they will be deployed. There are other mechanisms by which out-of-sample deployment can affect recourse that are now shown here. In particular, models that do not allow users to adjust the threshold to a target population may result in infeasibility or higher costs for that population. Moreover, the set of feasible actions can differ significantly between populations. Both of these differences were controlled for in this experiment: we fixed the same action set, the same costs, and adjusted the threshold), so the observed effects of out-of-sample deployment only depend on distributional differences in the out-ofsample feature.
Evaluating Disparities in Recourse
We consider an experiment to demonstrate how our tools could be used to evaluate disparities in recourse across demographic groups. In particular, we wish to measure the disparity in recourse between males and females in a target population while controlling for potential confounders. Here, a disparity in recourse between males and females occurs if, given comparable individuals who are denied a loan in the target population, males will be able to make easier changes in order to obtain credit (or vice-versa).
Setup. We consider a processed version of the german dataset from the UCI Repository [3] . Here, y i = −1 if an individual is a "bad customer," which we assume means they have not repaid a loan. The dataset contains n = 1, 000 individuals and d = 26 features related to their loan application, financial status, and demographics. The dataset includes a feature, gender, which is purposely excluded from model training. We trained a classifier using ℓ 2 penalized logistic regression. We set the approval threshold for our classifier to approve individuals with a predicted probability of 80%. We ran an audit over all individuals who were denied the loan, and examined disparities between individuals who were matched on their true label y and predicted risk Pr (y = +1).
Results. As shown in Figure 6 , the cost of recourse can vary between males and females in the target population. The plot in the top-left shows the cost for females and males among individuals with a true label of y = 1, while the plot in the top-right shows the cost for females and males among individuals with a true label of y = −1. The disparities in recourse can be seen more clearly in the lift-plots (middle row), which show the ratio between the median cost of recourse for females and males. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented new tools to measure the feasibility and cost of recourse for a linear classifier in a target population. We have shown how these tools can be used to inform a range of stakeholders, including: practitioners, who may unknowingly affect recourse through common modeling decisions; regulators, who may be interested in certifying that a model provides recourse over a target population; and individuals, who may wish to know how they can attain a desired outcome.
Extensions
Non-Linear Classifiers. We are currently extending our tools to audit recourse for non-linear classifiers. The tools in this work can be immediately extended to this setting in a different (albeit flawed) manner by solving our IP with a linear approximation of the local decision boundary in actionable space [i.e., using an approach similar to the one in 24]. This approach may be useful as a heuristic to create flipsets, but it is flawed since it does not provide a guarantee of infeasibility required to audit recourse.
Evaluating Strategic Incentives. Our tools can price incentives induced by a model by comparing the cost of recourse for different action sets [see e.g., 19]. Consider a case where a credit score contains features that are causally related to creditworthiness (e.g., income) as well as ancillary features that have predictive value but are prone to manipulation (e.g., social media presence). In this case, we could evaluate incentive structures in a target population by comparing the cost of recourse using only the causal features, using only the ancillary features. If changes using the ancillary features are more costly, then individuals within the target population may not be incentivized to manipulate the model.
Measuring
Flexibility. An interesting extension of our work is to run an audit where, for each individual in our target sample, we enumerate all distinct minimal-cost actions that will attain a desired outcome (i.e., by running the enumeration procedure in Algorithm 1 until the IP becomes infeasible). This produces a collection of minimal-cost actions that fully characterizes all of the ways in which an individual can attain a desired outcome. The size of this collection reflects the flexibility of recourse for an individual, which could be used to quantitatively assess properties of the recourse set (e.g., if a classifier provides 16 types of changes that provide recourse, 15 of which are legally contestable, then the model may be deemed contestable). This audit would be computationally intensive, but not necessarily intractable given that enumerating all actions can be achieved quickly based on the size of the action set (i.e., ≤ 5 seconds for example in Figure 3 ).
Evaluating Robustness. Although our work has focused on how our tools could be used to evaluate recourse, they could also be used to check if a classifier is robust to manipulation (e.g., one can run an audit to ensure that individuals in a target population cannot produce a desired outcome by making adversarial changes).
Limitations
Potentially Misleading Flipsets. Unlike adverse action notices, flipsets do not necessarily reveal the principle reasons for a decision. Further, they may not present legally contestable information when it exists. If a model uses a large number of features, an individual who receives their flipset could reduce their score by unknowingly changing features omitted from the flipset. This limitation can be overcome by providing users with clear guidelines (e.g., a list of all features, or the signs of their coefficients). Alternatively, one could produce a worst-case flipset of excessive actions that will flip the prediction and provide a buffer for interim changes.
Cost Functions. Our off-the-shelf cost functions depend on percentile distributions, which may not correctly reflect the difficulty of recourse (e.g., if there are not enough samples from the target population, or the sample does not reflect the target population).
In practice, we expect auditors to choose cost functions carefully, and we provide guidelines to this end in Section 3.2. Our tools provide flexibility in their choice of cost function, albeit it requires cost functions that are "almost" separable. We do not see the latter constraint as a major limitation as such functions may be difficult to specify.
Potential for Manipulation. Providing individuals with flipsets has the drawback in that it could lead individuals to maliciously manipulate the model to attain a desired outcome. Releasing flipsets could also lead to model theft (see e.g. [35] , and efforts to reproduce the Schufa credit score in Germany in [22] ). Manipulation may be avoided by releasing flipsets with actions pertaining to features that are causally related to the predicted outcome, or by deploying a model that only uses such features in the first place [see e.g., 27]. In light of potential model theft, it would be interesting to study lower bounds for the number of actions must be collected to faithfully reconstruct a proprietary model, and whether model theft could be mitigated by producing flipsets with actions that have weaker guarantees.
Broader Discussion
Machine Learning. At first glance, the goal of building a model that provides recourse may appear to be in conflict with the goal of building a model that is robust to manipulation. However, this is not always the case. A model could be trained with features so that an individual will only have recourse by making constructive changes (e.g. a person who is denied credit can only be approved by changing features that improve their creditworthiness, such as income). A model could also be trained so that an individual can attain a desired outcome by making "antagonistic" changes, but is incentivized to make constructive changes (see Section 5.1 for a discussion on how our tools can evaluate such incentives). As shown in Section 4, recourse and predictive accuracy are not necessarily incompatible: it may be possible to train a model that guarantees recourse that is just as accurate as a model that does not. As suggested by Example 2.1, however, classification problems could present trade-offs between recourse and predictive accuracy. For example, a credit score could include immutable features that improve predictive accuracy but reduce individual agency in the model's decision-making process. Such a trade-off would present a difficult decision in terms of which model to deploy. Should we deploy a loan approval that has perfect predictive accuracy but that precludes certain individuals from receiving loans? Or should we deploy a model that provides all individuals with recourse but that may allocate loans inefficiently?
Policy Implications. Individual rights with respect to algorithmic decision-making are often motivated by the need for agency over machine-made decisions (e.g., autonomy is a core motivation for data protection as discussed by, e.g., [37] ). Recourse reflects a precise notion of agency, namely the ability to meaningfully influence a decision-making process.
While a lack of recourse may be legally contestable in applications where models allocate goods that should be universally accessible (e.g. credit or hiring), it is not clear if the right to recourse extends to other applications where humans are subjected to automated decisions. In recidivism prediction, for example, a recourse audit may reveal contestable information if a defendant who is predicted to recidivate due to their age and prior criminal history could not alter this decision by clearing their criminal history 6 . While regulations for algorithmic decision-making are still in their infancy, many existing regulations tackle the need for agency through transparency and explanation [see e.g., regulations for credit scores in the United States in 36]. In light of this, we believe that recourse should be treated as an independent policy objective since: (i) it reflects a fundamental notion of justice (i.e., that individuals should have meaningful agency over decisions that impact their livelihood); and (ii) it is a precisely defined notion that can be practically regulated in many real-world applications. The tools in this work provide an important first step towards this goal, as linear classifiers are often deployed in applications where recourse is important.
A OMITTED PROOFS Remark 1
Proof. Given a classifier f : X → {−1, +1}, let us define the space of feature vectors that are assigned a negative and positive label as H − = {x ∈ X | f (x) = −1} and H + = {x ∈ X | f (x) = +1}, respectively. Since the classifier f does not trivially predict a single class over the target population, there must exist at least one feature vector x ∈ H − and at least one feature vector x ′ ∈ H + . Given any feature vector x ∈ H − , choose a fixed point x ′ ∈ H + . Since all features are actionable, the set of feasible actions from x must contain an action vector a = x ′ − x . Thus, the classifier provides x with recourse as
Since our choice of x was arbitrary, the previous result holds for all feature vectors x ∈ H − and therefore the classifier provides recourse to individuals in the target population. □
Remark 2
Proof. Given a linear classifier with coefficients w ∈ R d +1
, let j denote the index of an unbounded feature that can be increased or decreased arbitrarily. Assume, without loss of generality, that w j > 0. Given a feature vector x such that f (x) = sign(w ⊤ x) = −1, the set of feasible actions from x must contain an action vector Our proof use the following lemma in Fawzi et al. [14] , which we have reproduced using our own notation for completeness: Lemma A.1 (Fawzi et al. [14] ). Given a non-trivial linear classifier with w A 0, the optimal cost of recourse from x ∈ H − can be bounded as
The proof of Theorem 2.3 follows.
Proof. First we have
Note that by Lemma A.1 we have
Likewise for the other three terms, we have We further note the following:
The above also holds for E H v jk j ∈ J disc a j ∈ R j ∈ J disc u j ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J disc v jk ∈ {0, 1} k = 1...m j j ∈ J disc
Here, we denote the indices of all actionable features as J A = J cts ∪ J disc , where J cts and J disc are the index sets of real-valued features and discrete-valued features, respectively. The main differences between the IPs in 2 and 8 are that we represent the actions for realvalued features j ∈ J cts as continuous variables a j ∈ [a min j , a max j ] in (8c), and that we only define the indicator variables u j and v jk for discrete features.
The IP in (8) has the drawback that is requires users to specify a linear cost function, and is slightly harder to customize and optimize when we wish to introduce constraints on feasible actions. If we wish to limit the number of features that can be changed, for example, we must introduce indicator variables of the form u j = 1[a j 0] for real-valued features j ∈ J cts . These variables can only be set using "Big-M" constraints, which are difficult to optimize and may produce numerical issues [see e.g., the introduction to 4, for a recent discussion]. In contrast, the IP in (8) 
